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Abstract 
Daniel Hutto’s Enactive account of social cognition maintains that pre- and non-linguistic 
interactions do not require that the participants represent the psychological states of the other.  
This goes against traditional ‘cognitivist’ accounts of these social phenomena.  This essay 
examines Hutto’s Enactive account, and proposes two challenges.  The account maintains that 
organisms respond to the behaviours of others, and in doing so respond to the ‘intentional 
attitude’ which the other has.  The first challenge argues that there is no adequate account of how 
the organisms respond to the correct aspect of the behaviour in each situation.  The second 
challenge argues that the Enactive account cannot account for the flexibility of pre- and non-
linguistic responses to others.  The essay concludes that these challenges provide more than 
sufficient reason to doubt the viability of Hutto’s account as an alternative to cogntivist 
approaches to social cognition. 
 
Keywords:  Enactivism; Mindreading; Intentional Attitudes; Pre-linguistic 
understanding; Social Cognition;  
 
Lavelle, J.S. (2011).  ‘Two challenges to Hutto’s Enactive account of pre-
linguistic social cognition.’Philosophia, 40, 459 - 472 
 
2 
Two challenges to Hutto’s Enactive account 
of pre-linguistic social cognition 
1.  Introduction 
An infant is watching an adult trying to reach for a toy.  After a few moments, the 
infant picks up the toy and hands it to the adult.  Such interactions are common-
place by the time an infant reaches 14 months of age (Warneken & Tomasello, 
2007), but there remains significant philosophical debate about how we should 
explain this kind of behaviour. Theory-theory (Botterill & Carruthers, 1999; Gopnik 
& Wellman, 1992; Segal, 1996), Simulation theory (Goldman, 1989, 1993, 2006; 
Gordon, 1996; Heal, 1996) and Direct perception (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008) 
approaches to social cognition all believe that this kind of interaction should be 
explained by claiming that the infant is able to understand or grasp the adult’s 
psychological state. These approaches differ significantly in their explanations of 
how the infant attributes mental states to the adult, with Theory-theory maintaining 
that the infant infers the other’s mental states through the use of a ‘theory of mind’, 
whilst Simulation theory suggesting that the infant manages to ‘simulate’ the other’s 
mental state using her own cognitive apparatus, and then infers that this is the 
mental state the other has (although some Simulationist approaches attempt to do 
away with inference altogether, e.g. Goldman and Gallese 1996).  Recently hybrid 
accounts incorporating aspects of both Simulation- and Theory-theory have also 
become popular (Nichols and Stich, 2003).  By contrast, Direct perception views 
maintain that the infant can directly perceive the adult’s psychological state.  
However, despite these differences, all these views concur that attributing to the 
infant knowledge (of some kind) of the adult’s psychological state best explains this 
interaction. 
 Daniel Hutto’s Enactive account of social cognition (henceforth, the Enactive 
account) stands in contrast to these views by maintaining that the infant does not 
need to know what the adult’s psychological state is in order to respond 
appropriately to it. 1 This short piece examines the Enactive account and introduces 
two challenges.  The first challenge is to the Enactive account’s claim that the infant 
responds to a ‘sign’ for the adult’s intentional state, rather than the state itself.  The 
worry is that there are potentially many signs to which the infant could respond, and 
it is not clear how she is able to pick out the appropriate one in each situation.  The 
second challenge addresses the flexibility of human interactions, and argues that the 
Enactive account does not have resources to accommodate this feature of human 
behaviour. 
                                                          
1
 There are a number of accounts of cognition which describe themselves as ‘Enactive’.  
Throughout this paper the focus is on Hutto’s brand of Enactivism as defended in his book 
‘Folk Psychological Narratives’, and the arguments explored may not apply to other Enactive 
approaches. 
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2.  The Enactive account of social cognition 
In order to fully understand the Enactive account one must first understand its 
architectural commitments.  This section gives an overview of these commitments 
before going on to show how they form the foundation of the Enactive account of 
social cognition. 
2.1  Architectural commitments of the Enactive account 
A controversial claim made by the Enactive account is that pre-linguistic infants and 
non-human organisms cannot have representational mental states.  
Representational mental states are psychological states that are directed at some 
state of affairs, where the state of affairs is represented to the organism in some 
way.2  The state of affairs towards which the organism is directed is the ‘content’ of 
the organism’s mental state, and the manner in which it is directed is the ‘attitude’.  
In saying that Alfred wants a dog, we are saying that Alfred is in a particular 
psychological state: one where he is directed in the manner of ‘wanting’ towards a 
particular state of affairs – owning a dog.  In order for Alfred to have this particular 
psychological state, he must have the capacity of representing the state of affairs 
that is ‘owning a dog’.  Hutto argues that only organisms with language are capable 
of representational mental states (FPN3, p.23, 61 & p.122-3; 2009, p.545; 
forthcoming).4   
 This commitment has a number of important consequences for the Enactive 
account.  First, whilst the Enactive account denies non-linguistic organisms 
representational mental states, it does not deny that they are able to have 
intentionality, that is, it does not deny that these organisms can engage in activities 
that are directed at particular features of the world.  The Enactive account therefore 
needs an alternative account of how such intentionality comes about. This it gives in 
the form of ‘Intentional attitudes’, organismic states which enable the organism to 
be directed towards the world without having representational mental states.  An 
organism has an intentional attitude when it is engaged in a ‘goal-directed activity’ 
(Hutto forthcoming, ms. p 11).  Because intentional attitudes are a type of activity, 
they should be understood as a state the whole organism is in, rather than a state of 
the organism’s cognitive system.  Importantly, an organism does not need to 
represent the state of affairs or worldly feature that it is directed towards in order to 
be in the intentional attitude that is directed towards that state of affairs.  A bat 
flying towards the source of an FM wave it has just perceived has an intentional 
attitude, because its activity is directed towards the source of the FM wave.  The bat 
                                                          
2
 Note that organisms are not directed towards the proposition, but towards the state of 
affairs represented by that proposition. 
3
 FPN: Hutto, D.D. (2008) Folk Psychological Narratives:  the sociocultural basis of 
understanding reasons.   
4
 This essay will not discuss or assess Hutto’s reasons for holding this view, for more see 
FPN, ch. 5&7. 
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does not cognitively represent the source of the FM wave as the goal of its activity, 
but this does not preclude us from characterising the activity as intentional.   
 In characterising intentional attitudes as activities, the Enactive account is 
making a distinctive claim regarding the architecture of non-linguistic cognition.  It 
is an important feature of representational mental states that they can be cognitively 
integrated with each other, meaning that they can enter into the inferential 
processes required for reasoning.  In being activities, however, intentional attitudes 
do not have the right structure to enter inferential relations and reasoning processes 
(FPN, p. 60).  One cannot infer another intentional attitude from an existing one.  
Intentional attitudes are simply states that an organism goes into; they just do not 
have the right kind of structure to enter into logical relations with other aspects of 
the organism.  Furthermore, in saying that non-linguistic organisms can only have 
intentional attitudes, the Enactive account is denying that non-linguistic organisms 
can engage in the kind of inferential and logical reasoning that requires 
representational mental states.  
 The second consequence of denying representational states to non-linguistic 
organisms is that the Enactive account must give an account of non-linguistic social 
cognition which does not draw on representational psychological states.  Traditional 
cognitivist accounts of social cognition, like the Theory-theory and Simulation 
theory, maintain that non-linguistic social interaction is best explained by saying 
that such organisms are able to have metarepresentational mental states, 
representational mental states that have as their content the other person’s 
psychological state.  On these accounts the interaction between the infant and adult 
mentioned earlier is best explained by saying that the infant was able to have a 
metarepresentational mental state of the sort ‘I believe that the adult wants the toy’.  
In denying pre-linguistic infants representational, and thus metarepresentational 
mental states, the Enactive account must give an alternative account of their social 
interactions.  
2.2  Intentional attitudes and natural signs 
The Enactive account answers the question of how pre- and non-linguistic 
interactions come about in the absence of metarepresentational states by 
introducing the ‘natural signs’ framework.  This section outlines what is meant by a 
natural sign, and how to characterise an organism’s response to such signs, before 
going on to explain how this framework is meant to work in the case of human 
interactions. 
There are many things in the world which reliably correlate with other 
things; the number of rings on a tree correlates with its age, as do the rings on a 
turtle’s shell.  If a feature of the natural world reliably correlates with some other 
feature, then we can say that it is a ‘natural sign’.  A ‘natural sign’ is not created with 
the intention to communicate something; it is simply a phenomenon whose 
occurrence reliably correlates with some other occurrence.  The turtle’s rings are a 
natural sign of its age because there is a reliable correlation between the number of 
Lavelle, J.S. (2011).  ‘Two challenges to Hutto’s Enactive account of pre-
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rings on its shell and its age.  X is a natural sign of Y when the occurrence of X has a 
suitably high (that is, statistically significant) correlation with the occurrence of Y. 
 It is also the case that many organisms have developed a sensitivity to 
natural signs, allowing them to exploit the sign to benefit from the thing it correlates 
with.  Hutto offers the example of bats and the FM waves created by moths (FPN, 
p.52).  The beating of moths’ wings produces FM frequencies and bats have 
echolocation apparatus which can detect these frequencies.  The FM frequency is a 
natural sign of the presence of moths as it reliably occurs with the presence of 
moths.  Bats have echolocation abilities which enable them to detect this natural 
sign and use it to guide them to the moth. It has been the case for many thousands of 
years (since the evolution of moths as we know them, in fact) that FM waves of a 
particular sort have been a natural sign for the presence of moths.  We can also 
envisage an organism evolving an innate sensitivity to this natural sign, provided the 
correlation between the sign and the occurrence of the other thing remained stable.  
 Hutto labels the response which an organism has to a natural sign as an 
‘Action Co-ordination Routine’.  Action Co-ordination Routines are a type of 
intentional attitude, as they are goal-directed activities.  The perception of a natural 
sign causes organisms to enter into an Action Co-ordination Routine which is 
directed towards the state of affairs the sign correlates with.  One should understand 
the engagement of the Action Co-ordination Routine upon perception of the natural 
sign to be automatic, analogous to a reflexive movement. Care needs to be taken in 
how we characterise the success conditions of an Action Co-ordination Routine.  An 
Action Co-ordination Routine is successful when it functions as it was selected to 
function.  For instance, if a bat perceived the signal which corresponds with an 
insect being 12m to its left, and responds by flying 12m to its left and swallowing 
whatever is there, then the Action Co-ordination Routine is successful.  If, in the 
same situation, it should transpire that the object emitting the signal is not a moth 
but a radio mast, then we do not say that the Action Co-ordination Routine was 
unsuccessful or at fault, because it unfolded as it should have done.  
It is crucial to Hutto’s view that when an organism perceives a natural sign it 
does not need to represent the state of affairs which that sign correlates with in 
order to respond appropriately to that sign.  He writes, 
The signs themselves do no declarative work, nor are they interpreted as doing such 
by organisms or their perceptual mechanisms when they respond to them 
appropriately in discharging their proper functions.  It is not as if one part of the 
system in any sense tells the other that “this is how things stand” in the process.   
(FPN, pp.47-48, emphasis in original.) 
The bat’s cognitive system does not need to represent ‘moth at L’ when it perceives 
the sign that triggers the appropriate Action Co-ordination Routine.  The bat’s motor 
and cognitive systems have evolved to respond in a particular way to the perception 
of FM waves, and this response is entirely appropriate given the state of affairs that 
correlates with this natural sign.  Although the Action Co-ordination Routine is 
Lavelle, J.S. (2011).  ‘Two challenges to Hutto’s Enactive account of pre-
linguistic social cognition.’Philosophia, 40, 459 - 472 
 
6 
directed towards the source of the FM wave, the bat has no representation of this 
goal of its activity. 
We are now in a position to understand the Enactive account’s claim that... 
 ...both infants and adults are directly responsive to the psychological situation of 
others because they are informationally sensitive to a special class of natural signs – 
the expressions of intentional and affective attitudes, as revealed in another’s gaze, 
gesture, facial comportment and so on.  
(FPN pp. 116-117). 
The natural signs in question are people’s behaviours, and the state of affairs which 
they correlate with is a particular intentional attitude.  When a pre-linguistic infant 
perceives a behaviour that is a natural sign for an intentional attitude it causes her 
to enter into an Action Co-ordination Routine.  This Action Co-ordination Routine is 
an intentional attitude which is directed towards the intentional attitude of the 
acting adult.  As organisms do not in any way represent the state of affairs that 
correlates with the natural sign they perceive, this explains how the infant can 
respond to the adult’s intentional attitude without representing or knowing about it 
in any way.  Her response is nevertheless appropriate to the adult’s intentional 
attitude, because the adult’s behaviour reliably correlates with his intentional 
attitude, in much the same way as an FM wave correlates with the presence of a 
moth at a certain location.  Because the infant’s own response is an intentional 
attitude, (in the form of the Action Co-ordination Routine), she does not need to 
represent what she is directed towards, meaning that she does not need to 
represent the adult’s intentional attitude.  On the Enactive account, infants have ‘‘no 
conceptual understanding of, or any capacity to represent what they are tracking as 
mental states as such or, indeed, as anything at all.’ (Hutto, forthcoming, ms. p.13).     
3.  Problems for the Enactive account  
The architectural commitments of the Enactive account lead it to make the startling 
claim that pre-linguistic social interactions can be described as responses to natural 
signs, where the natural signs in question are behaviours and the state of affairs that 
they correlate with is the intentional attitude of the other.  This account of pre-
linguistic interaction faces a critical problem, however, concerning how one should 
characterise ‘natural signs’.  This section examines this problem before introducing 
another, namely, how to explain infants’ responses when the behaviour they 
perceive could be a natural sign for more than one intentional attitude. This second 
problem is an artefact of the first, which serves to put more pressure on the natural 
signs framework. 
3.1  What counts as a natural sign? 
The importance of defining a natural sign can be illustrated through the results of an 
elegant experiment conducted by György Gergely and colleagues (2002).  14 month 
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old infants watched as an experimenter turned on a light by touching it with her 
head.  In one condition (‘hands free’ condition) the experimenter had both of her 
hands on the table, before leaning to turn on the light with her head.  In another 
condition (‘hands occupied’ condition) the experimenter shivered and wrapped a 
shawl around her shoulders, thus covering her hands.  She then leant forward and 
turned on the light with her head.  The light was then pushed across the table to the 
infant.  69% of infants who had observed the ‘hands free’ condition responded by 
turning on the light using their head; whilst only 21% of infants who had observed 
the ‘hands occupied’ condition turned on the light using their head.  These results 
suggest that the infants were able to distinguish two separate goals from the 
behaviours: infants in the ‘hands free’ condition infants responded to the goal of 
‘turning on the light with the head’, whereas infants in the ‘hands occupied’ 
condition responded to the goal of ‘turning on the light, simpliciter’.   
 In each trial the experimenter’s behaviour can be described in a variety of 
ways.  One could say that she is illuminating the light, that she is moving her head at 
a particular speed, that she is smiling, that she is touching the light, that she is 
touching the light with her head, etc.  All of these descriptions could be true for the 
behavioural sequence observed.  Each of these descriptions picks out an aspect of 
the behaviour.  One focuses on its speed, the other on the contact with the light, etc.  
Each aspect of the behaviour can also be understood as a natural sign for a 
particular intentional attitude.  For instance, the speed of the movement is the 
natural sign for the intentional attitude of wanting to contact the light with a 
particular force;5 touching the light is the natural sign for the intentional attitude of 
wanting to make contact with the light; touching the light with one’s head is the 
natural sign for the intentional attitude of wanting to touch the light with a 
particular part of the body.  In any behavioural sequence there will be an indefinite 
number of aspects to that behaviour, some of which will be natural signs for the 
actor’s intentional attitudes, and some of which won’t correlate with a particular 
intentional attitude. 
 One of these aspects of the behaviour will be the natural sign for what we 
consider to be the ‘appropriate’ intentional attitude in that situation.  The 
appropriate intentional attitude is the one we expect the infant to respond to: in the 
case when the experimenter’s hands are free the appropriate intentional attitude is 
‘wanting to turn on the light with the head’. There is an aspect of the behaviour that 
is the natural sign for this intentional attitude.  The crucial question is how the infant 
picks out the aspect of the behaviour that is the natural sign for that intentional 
attitude.  It is clear that the infant does respond to the natural sign for what we 
would term the ‘appropriate’ intentional attitude, but how she picks that sign out 
from the variety with which she is presented is puzzling.  The puzzle deepens when 
one takes into account that the infant is not able to have any knowledge of the 
                                                          
5
 This is not an accurate description of the intentional attitude, as ‘I want to contact the light 
with a certain force’ is a representational mental state.  However, as there is no way of 
transcribing intentional attitudes into linguistic terms this must suffice for present purposes. 
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experimenter’s intentional attitudes.  What could the criteria be for choosing the 
most appropriate natural sign to respond to, where ‘most appropriate’ is the natural 
sign that corresponds with the relevant intentional attitude for this situation?  This 
is a serious challenge for the Enactive account. 
 One might object that the infant has perceived others turning on lights 
before, and that this prior knowledge enables the infant to pick out the relevant 
natural sign here.  But this does not help the Enactive account.  Although infants will 
have seen adults turning on lights before, they will have witnessed the most 
common way of doing so, namely, flipping a switch on the wall.  In this situation they 
perceive someone illuminating a light by touching it with their head.  The 
behaviours which serve as a natural sign for the intentional attitude of ‘wanting to 
turn on the light’ are very different across these two instances.  It is thus not clear 
how the infant’s prior experience of ‘light illuminating’ behaviour would help her 
pick out the appropriate natural sign in this instance.   
Noam Chomsky ran a similar argument in 1959 against Frank Skinner’s 
behaviourist account of verbal behaviour (1957).  Chomsky’s concern was that the 
‘stimulus’ which Skinner claimed caused a particular behaviour could be one of an 
indefinite number of properties in the environment.  One doesn’t know which 
property of the environment is going to ‘count’ as the stimulus for the organism’s 
behaviour until one sees what the organism responds to.  Chomsky offers the 
example of showing someone a painting and asking for their opinion.  One doesn’t 
know which aspect of the painting the subject will comment on until they make their 
comment.  Thus the subject could answer with any one of ‘‘Clashes with the wall-
paper, I thought you liked abstract work, Never saw it before, tilted, hanging too low, 
beautiful, hideous, remember our camping trip last summer?’ (1959, p. 31).  On a 
behaviourist approach each of these responses must be caused by a different 
property in the painting and its surroundings, where each different property is the 
‘stimulus’ for a given response.  But this, as Chomsky points out, makes a nonsense 
of the concept of a ‘stimulus’, for a stimulus is no longer an objective property in the 
environment.  It is whatever the subject chooses to respond to, and as there are an 
indefinite number of properties in the situation, one cannot predict what the subject 
will choose as their ‘stimulus’ until you hear their response. 
Although Chomsky was criticising an account of how very complex 
behaviours come about, in contrast to the more basic ones the Enactive account is 
dealing with, I believe a parallel argument afflicts the Enactive account’s portrayal of 
pre-linguistic interactions as consisting in responses to natural signs.  ‘Natural signs’ 
for intentional attitudes are not an objective feature of our social environment.  
Instead, one could pick out any property or aspect of a behaviour and say that it is a 
natural sign for a particular intentional attitude. Natural signs, like properties, are 
‘free for the asking’ (Chomsky, 1959, p. 32).  One doesn’t know which natural sign, 
and therefore which intentional attitude, an infant will respond to until she makes 
her response.  It doesn’t make sense to say that there is one natural sign ‘out there’ 
in the environment for the infant to perceive; rather, there are indefinitely many 
natural signs reliably correlating with an indefinite number of intentional attitudes 
Lavelle, J.S. (2011).  ‘Two challenges to Hutto’s Enactive account of pre-
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for the infant to perceive.  Only one set of these natural signs will correlate with the 
appropriate intentional attitude for the infant to respond to.  The question is, how 
does the infant pick out those features of the environment which are the natural sign 
for the appropriate intentional attitude in this instance?  The natural signs 
framework will only succeed if the Enactive account can deliver a more careful 
account of what a natural sign is, and how an infant chooses the right one to respond 
to. 
 In response, the Enactive account could question the assumption that infants 
have no way of choosing which natural signs to respond to.  Rather, the infant has a 
host of innate sensitivities to particular aspects of social interactions, which make 
those aspects more salient to them. For instance, it has been demonstrated that pre-
linguistic infants are attuned to those movements and behaviours which are 
normally caused by intentional mental states, paying more attention to them than to 
those which are involuntary or random (Johnson, 2000; 2003).  It has also been 
found that 9 month old infants will follow another’s head movements, whilst 10-12 
month infants have the slightly more sophisticated ability to follow another’s eye-
movements (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2007).  These, and a host of other findings 
concerning infants’ attentional capacities, suggest that infants are drawn to salient 
aspects of a social situation, which facilitates their perception of the relevant natural 
sign.  Natural signs may be ‘free for the asking’, but an infant’s cognitive capacities 
ensure that she attends only to those signs which are relevant to the particular 
situation.  Once the sign is noticed, she can engage her response to it.  
 It should be noted that Mindreading views such as Theory-theory and 
Simulation theory agree that these attentional capacities in young infants play an 
important role in their early interactions.  The difference between these views and 
the Enactive account discussed here is that Mindreading views argue that this 
capacity needs to be supplemented by the attribution of some kind of goal or other 
psychological state in order for the infant to respond appropriately.  On the Enactive 
account, the infant’s innate sensitivities attune her to the relevant natural sign, and 
she responds to the sign with the appropriate behaviour.  It seems like the Enactive 
account offers the more parsimonious explanation, as it does away with the step of 
attributing a psychological state to the other. 
 Whether innate sensitivities are sufficient to guide and infant’s response to a 
natural sign, and whether the Enactive account is indeed more parsimonious than 
Mindreading ones are questions that require further discussion.6  My aim here has 
simply been to point out that the problem of determining what counts as a natural 
sign is a significant one for the Enactive account, and if innate attentional 
sensitivities are to do the relevant work, then more explanation of how this could be 
the case and why we should consider them sufficient to do the job is required.  
However, there remain more significant problems for the Enactive account to 
counter, and these are what we turn to now. 
                                                          
6
 Fitzpatrick (2009) offers an excellent discussion of the role of parsimony in the 
mindreading debates. 
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3.2  One behaviour, many intentional attitudes 
Another question facing the Enactive account is ‘how do infants track the 
appropriate intentional attitude when one natural sign could correlate with a 
number of different intentional attitudes?’  When the experimenter pushes the light 
towards the infant, this behaviour could be the natural sign for the intentional 
attitude of ‘wanting the light away from me’ or ‘wanting to give the light to you’, or 
‘wanting to put the light in a neutral area’.  The same goes for the behaviour of 
turning on the light with the head.  In some cases this behaviour correlates with the 
intentional attitude of ‘turning on the light with my head’ and in others with the 
intentional attitude of ‘turning on the light, simpliciter’.  Somehow the infant 
responds to the appropriate intentional attitude in this situation, even though the 
natural sign of the behaviour correlates with several.  The infant cannot know that, 
even though behaviour B is the natural sign for intentional attitudes X, Y, and Z, the 
appropriate intentional attitude to respond to in this situation is intentional attitude 
X, because this kind of knowledge cannot exist on the Enactive account.  So how does 
the Enactive account explain the fact that infants are able to respond to the 
appropriate intentional attitude when the natural sign they perceive corresponds 
with several?7 
 One response available to the Enactive account is to deny that there are 
behaviours which could be natural signs for a variety of intentional attitudes.  There 
is a one-to-one mapping of behaviour to intentional attitude.  What the above 
argument fails to appreciate is that the behaviour which correlates with an 
intentional attitude must be specified clearly.  It is not the case that ‘touching the 
light with your head’ could be the natural sign for the intentional attitudes of either 
‘wanting to touch the light with your head’ or ‘wanting to touch the light, 
simpliciter’.  Rather, the description of the natural sign as ‘touching the light with the 
head’ is misleading.  Instead, one should say that the behaviour of ‘touching the light 
with one’s head whilst one’s hands are occupied’ is the natural sign for the 
intentional attitude of turning on the light simpliciter, while the behaviour of 
‘touching the light with one’s head whilst one’s hands are free’ is the natural sign for 
the intentional attitude of ‘turning on the light with one’s head’.  A more careful 
description of the behaviour shows that there is a one-to-one mapping between a 
behaviour and an intentional attitude. 
 But this does not help the Enactive account, for this response then runs up 
against the problem discussed earlier, namely, that of how the infant picks out which 
                                                          
7
 One might argue that infants gradually learn how to respond to a behaviour which correlates 
with more than one intentional attitude through trial and error (I’m grateful to a reviewer for 
pointing out this possibility).  But trial and error cannot explain why a statistically significant 
percentage of infants in Gergeley’s study succeed in responding to the ‘right’ intentional attitude 
in a novel situation.  How often infants (and non-human animals) are able to respond to the 
appropriate intentional attitude in novel situations is an empirical question, and further analysis 
of the empirical literature is needed to address this issue further. 
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aspect of the behaviour should be the natural sign in a particular instance.  For what 
this response entails is that the infant notices the position of the experimenter’s 
hands as part of the ‘natural sign’ behaviour that she should respond to.  And the 
question then becomes ‘how does the infant make this discrimination?’  How does 
she know that in this case the natural sign she is looking for consists in both a 
behaviour of touching the light, and a behaviour involving the position of the 
experimenter’s hands?  On what grounds does the infant take these features of the 
behaviour to be the natural sign to which she should respond, rather than a different 
collection of features of the behaviour?  Innate sensitivities alone do not seem up to 
the explanatory task here, as we must show how they enable the infant to recognise 
subtle cues and differences between situations.  On the other hand, the view that 
infants can recognise the other’s goal, and has some grasp of a principle of 
directness, can explain the infants’ responses.  The Enactive account once again 
faces the problem of explaining how infants pick out the relevant natural sign in the 
situation they are presented with, reiterating how significant this problem is for the 
account.   
4.  The flexibility of human behaviour 
The problem of discriminating natural signs in human behaviour is one of two 
substantive problems for the Enactive account.  The second concerns how it explains 
the flexibility of pre-linguistic behaviour, and indeed of non-human behaviour such 
as that of bats.  This problem stems from the architectural commitments of the 
Enactive account.  If intentional attitudes do not have the correct structure for 
entering into inferential relations, it is not obvious how the Enactive account 
explains how the intentional attitude an organism is currently in can affect its 
response to a natural sign. 
As the Enactive account characterises the interaction, a bat perceives an FM 
wave and responds by flying in a particular direction for a certain distance, and 
swallowing whatever it finds at that location.  One can predict how the bat’s 
behaviour will change as the variables of the strength of FM wave, its distance and 
direction, alter.  But it is misleading to say that ‘whenever a bat perceives an FM 
wave it will engage in “flying towards the source of that wave” behaviour’.  If the bat 
is fleeing a predator it is unlikely to respond to the FM wave in this way; if the bat is 
full of food it won’t engage in this response; likewise if the bat is injured and trying 
to return to its roost.  There are many more variables besides the features of the FM 
wave that will affect the bat’s behaviour, and one needs to account for their effects in 
an explanation of the bat’s behaviour. 
The problem is compounded in the human case, for how you respond to 
another’s behaviour depends on the kinds of psychological state you are currently in 
yourself.  Let’s take an interaction between an infant and her father, where the 
father is reaching for a ball that is between them. Her father has the intentional 
attitude of ‘wanting the ball’, but according to the Enactive account the infant cannot 
know that; she can only respond to his behaviour that correlates with that 
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intentional attitude.  In one situation, the infant has the intentional attitude of 
wanting the ball for herself.  In this situation, when she perceives her father’s 
behaviour of reaching for the ball, she responds to the natural sign that is his 
behaviour by grabbing the ball and moving it towards herself.  But in another 
situation, the infant has the intentional attitude of wanting to assist her father.  
When she perceives his movement towards the ball, she responds by pushing the 
ball towards him.  What this example is intended to illustrate is that the infant’s 
response to her father’s behaviour will vary depending on what her intentional 
attitude happens to be. What the Enactive approach needs to explain is how the 
infant can respond to her Father’s intentional attitude in a way that concords with 
her own intentional attitude, whilst being unaware of what his intentional attitude 
is.  Whilst the perception of a natural sign is meant to be sufficient for an infant to 
engage in an action co-ordination routine, which action co-ordination routine it is 
appropriate to engage in will depend on what the infant’s intentional attitude is 
when the natural sign is perceived.  And it seems to be the case that there are a 
significantly large number of intentional attitudes the infant could be in, each of 
which would generate a different response to the natural sign. 
 The Enactive account could explain the fact that the infant’s response to the 
natural signs she perceives will vary according to her own intentional attitudes by 
positing a cognitive mechanism which operates in something like the following way 
(where OA stands for the perceived ‘acting organism’ – in this case the father, and 
‘behaviour B’ is a natural sign for a particular intentional attitude in OA): 
If behaviour B is perceived in OA and you are in intentional attitude  → go into intentional 
attitude  C. 
If behaviour B is perceived in OA and you are in intentional attitude   → go into intentional 
attitude  D. 
If behaviour B is perceived in OA and you are in intentional attitude   → go into intentional 
attitude  E... Etc. 
In this way the infant’s cognitive system does not need to recognise her father’s 
intentional attitude, but she is still able to respond to his behaviour in a way that is 
appropriate given her own intentional attitudes.  All that is required is that her 
cognitive system registers what her current intentional attitude is, and what effect 
that intentional attitude should have on her response to her father.  Thus, the infant 
still responds appropriately to another’s intentional attitude without ever 
representing what that intentional attitude is. 
 But unpacking what would be required for something like the above story to 
work proves tricky.  One way of doing so would be to say that her cognitive 
processes contain a series of rules that determine which intentional attitude she 
should enter on perceiving B, with a different rule for each intentional attitude she 
could be in when perceiving B.  This clearly won’t work, for there is an indefinite 
number of intentional attitudes the infant could be in when she perceives B, and her 
cognitive system cannot store an indefinite number of rules.  Attempt one fails.  
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Attempt two at unpacking the story is to posit a general rule in the infant’s cognitive 
organisation along the lines of ‘if in intentional attitude of type X and B is perceived, 
then go into intentional attitude ; but if in intentional attitude of type Y, then go 
into intentional attitude .  But this too is problematic, for it would require pre-
linguistic organisms to have the kind of cognitive architecture the Enactive account 
denies them.  Intentional attitudes cannot enter into inferential relations (FPN, 
p.60), but in order for this story to work they must be able to, as classifying the 
intentional attitudes as being of one type or another requires that they enter into 
such relations.  Neither of these attempts to unpack the above solution are workable, 
and no others appear forthcoming.  It therefore looks like the suggested response 
does not work, leaving the Enactive account stuck with the problem of how to 
explain the flexibility of pre-linguistic social interactions.  Non-linguistic organisms 
are clearly able to alter their responses to others in line with their own 
psychological states, and if the Enactive account is to be a viable account of social 
cognition it must explain this phenomenon. 
One might suggest that instead of positing explicit rules, we can explain the 
infant’s behaviours simply by reference to a large number of ‘mappings’ existing 
between an infant’s intentional attitude and how this should affect her response to 
the behaviour perceived. In this way we can give an account of the infant’s reactions 
without positing a representational cognitive architecture.  But this simply brings us 
back to the fact that there must be an indefinitely large number of mappings stored.  
The advantage of a rule-based story is that instead of possessing a large number of 
discrete mappings, the infant instead possesses a small number of generative rules.  
Not only does this offer a more parsimonious explanation of infants’ internal 
cognitive architecture, but it also has the potential to explain infants’ success in 
responding appropriate to another in novel situations.  If the rules are generative 
and enable the infants to recognise types of intentional attitudes in others, then the 
infant has the resources to respond to new behaviours in an appropriate way.  Once 
again, further empirical work detailing infants’ responses in novel social situations 
can be used to distinguish between a rule-based account and a trial and error one 
(see note 7).  As things currently stand, the only available explanation for the 
flexibility of infants’ behaviour that is open to the Enactive account is to posit a large 
number of discrete mappings between all the possible intentional attitudes the 
infant could have, and how they should affect her response to the behaviour 
perceived.  But it is not clear what the account would gain from such an admission, 
nor why it is a more parsimonious than that offered by a rule-based account. 
5.  Conclusion 
Daniel Hutto’s Enactive account makes two bold claims: first, that pre- and non-
linguistic organisms cannot have representational mental states, but only 
intentional attitudes; and second, that pre- and non-linguistic social interactions are 
best understood as responses to natural signs.  This paper discussed two types of 
problem with the Enactive account.  The first concerns the nature of natural signs.  
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When it comes to human behaviour, there is an indefinite number of natural signs 
correlating with intentional attitudes, any of which the infant could respond to.  The 
Enactive account must explain how the infant notices the ‘right’ natural sign, whilst 
having no knowledge of the actor’s intentional attitude.  The Enactive account can 
counter this criticism by pointing to innate sensitivities that infants have, which 
cause them to pay attention to salient features of a social interaction.  But this does 
not seem sufficient to explain how infants can pick out relatively complex features of 
novel natural signs, such as the position of the experimenter’s hands in Gergely’s 
study.  The Enactive account needs to provide a more detailed explanation for how 
innate sensitivities can explain infants’ success at responding to natural signs in 
novel situations, and where the natural sign involved is more complex than a head 
turn, or a reach. 
The second type of argument concerns the open-ended nature of human 
responses.  Your own psychological states clearly have an effect on your responses 
to other’s behaviour, but in maintaining that pre- and non-linguistic infants cannot 
represent another’s intentional attitude, the Enactive account has trouble explaining 
this phenomenon.  The only available possibility is to maintain that infants possess 
an indefinitely large number of ‘mappings’ which determine, in a non-
representational way, how she should respond to another’s behaviour given her 
own intentional attitude.  But the question then arises as to why this provides a 
better explanation for the phenomenon than claiming the infant has a few rule-
based generalisations which guide her behaviour.  The explanatory advantage of the 
Enactive account’s position is not clear. 
In conclusion, the problem of how infants can recognise the appropriate 
natural sign to respond to from the large number they are presented with, is 
significant for the Enactive account, but there are some ways it can be countered 
through appeal to the innate attentional sensitivities of infants.  But there remains 
the problem of offering a satisfactory explanation for the flexibility of infants 
responses, and I have argued that positing a large number of discrete ‘mappings’ 
between an intentional attitude and behaviours perceived is not an adequate 
explanation.  As things currently stand, Hutto’s Enactive account does not provide a 
viable alternative to traditional accounts of social cognition.  
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